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Minority Game: a mean-field-like approach
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Departamento de F´ısica, Comisio´n Nacional de Energ´ıa Ato´mica,
Avda. del Libertador 8250,1429 Buenos Aires, Argentina
Abstract
We calculate the standard deviation of (N1 − N0), the difference of the
number of agents choosing between the two alternatives of the minority game.
Our approach is based on two approximations: we use the whole set of possible
strategies, rather than only those distributed between the agents involved in a
game; moreover, we assume that a period-two dynamics discussed by previous
authors is appropriate within the range of validity of our work. With these
appproximations we introduce a set of states of the system, and are able to
replace time averages by ensemble averages over these states. Our results
show a very good agreement with simulations results for most part of the
informationally efficient phase.
PACS Numbers: 05.65.+b, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
The minority game (MG) is an adaptive game introduced by Challet and Zhang [1] to
study competitive systems whose available resources are finite (ecology, financial systems,
traffic in Internet, etc).
At every step of the game, theN participants (agents) must choose one of two alternatives
(0 or 1, to buy or to sell, to choose one of two possible routes, etc.), and the winners will be
those who turn out to be in the minority. Each agent decides her move based on the history
of the game (a string of m bits with the information about the m previous minority sides),
using one of her set of s prescriptions or strategies. Feedback is established by a reward
system whereby every winner agent gets a point; moreover, out of all the strategies in the
game, those that correctly predicted the minority side also get a (so-called virtual) point.
The game is adaptive, because an agent will make her choise using the strategy that at this
particular time has more points.
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For every time step, let us call N0 (N1) the number of agents choosing side 0 (1), such
that N0+N1 = N . The main variable that is usually considered is σ, the standard deviation
of the difference (N1 −N0), as a function of N , m, and s,
σ2 =
1
T
T∑
t=1
(N1 −N0)
2 (1)
where T is the number of steps of the game.
The standard deviation σ is a measure of the form in which the resources (points) of
the population are used: whenever |N1 −N0| is small, more agents get a point, implying
a better utilization of the resources. The model has attracted some attention because for
certain values of m, s and N , σ turns out to be smaller than σr, the standard deviation of
a random-choise game, where the N agents choose sides randomly. This result implies that
althought there is no agent-agent interaction in the MG, there is some kind of emergent
coordination; in other words, there is an effective interaction that appears through global
magnitudes of the system. This collective behavior motivated a diversity of studies of the
MG, with a variety of techniques: numerical simulations [1], [2]; mean-field approximations
[3]; equivalence with spin-glass models [4]; thermal treatments [5], etc. Manuca et al. [3]
have studied the complete succession of minority sides, and used a specific mean-field to
calculate σ. In the present work we calculate σ for the same set of values of N , m and s
used by these authors, obtaining a somewhat better agreement with numerical results.
The public information on which strategies are based is the record of the last m minority
sides (that is why m is called the memory of the game). Then, there are H = 2m different
histories, the history at time t being the string k = (χt−m, ..., χt−1) where χt is the minority
side (0 or 1) which results after time t. In the following we will write k as an integer between
0 and 2m− 1. Every strategy is a function that assigns outputs (predictions of the following
minority side) for every one of the H possible inputs . Hence, there are L = 2H different
strategies in a game of memory m ; at the beginning of the game each agent is randomly
assigned s strategies, from the pool of L (with replacement).
It is known [3] that data for σ2/N displays scaling for every value of s when plotted as a
function of z = 2m/N . In fact the plot of σ2/N vs z has two different regions, as it is shown
in Fig. 1 : (i) z . 0.5, which is an informationally efficient phase. Here σ2/N is a decreasing
function of z, showing a change of behavior around σ2/N ≈ 1; (ii) z > 0.5, where σ2/N
increases and asymptotically approaches the line σ2/N = 1. This line corresponds to the
random-choise game. Our calculation is appropriate within a good part of the first region.
Usually, numerical simulations are carried over for a game of T time steps, and afterwards
the results are averaged over several independent runs of the game. In every run there are
ℓ ≡ sN strategies distributed between the agents, out of the pool L. There are two points
worth noticing: the pool L of all the strategies is symmetrical , in the sense that for every
possible history, the number of strategies predicting χt = 1 is equal to the number of
strategies predicting χt = 0; on the other hand, every set of ℓ strategies used in each run is
only approximately symmetrical, because it is just a finite sample of L. When the sample is
only of a moderate size, however, the difference between the properties of the sample and
the pool is small, and the corresponding uncertainty is known. Indeed, this is widely used
in standard ‘sampling’ techniques [6]: for instance, the uncertainty associated with samples
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of size ≈ 400 is less than ≈ 5%. These considerations are at the base of our calculation, as
we now explain.
In the following we will make analytic calculations over the whole pool L, rather than
over samples of size ℓ. In this form we will benefit from its symmetry, and also will be able
to calculate several magnitudes by simply counting different sets of pairs of strategies (for
s = 2). In this sense we are using sampling techniques the other way around: we start from
the pool, to find the samples’ properties. As it will be clear below, this is a mean-field-like
approach.
Equation (1) calculates σ as a time average over T time steps. We will replace this by
an ensamble average over a (restricted) set of states of the system. In Sec. II we introduce
the states and describe how a period-two dynamics observed in Ref. [3] can be used to
substantially reduce the number of states needed. In Sec. III we write down σ in terms of
the new variables; to carry out the actual calculation of σ we found it useful to make use of
some ad-hoc diagrams that are also explained. In the final section we offer some conclusions.
II. THE SPACE OF AVAILABLE STATES
In this work we will only consider games where s = 2, i.e. every agent has two strategies
to choose from. To find σ from Eq. (1) we need to write down expressions for N1/N and
N0/N . It is clear that the values of these ratios will fluctuate with the actual numerical
realization. We now assume that we can obtain approximate values for these variables by
using not N, the actual number of agents, but rather a game with N , the maximum amount
of (virtual) agents that can originate in the pool. N is equal to
(
L
2
)
+L, the number of pairs
of strategies that it is possible to make from the pool L (with replacement) 1 . Within this
approximation, we will calculate N1/N as ≈ N1/N , and N0/N ≈ N0/N , where N0(N1) is
the number of virtual agents choosing side 0 (1).
We now describe the states to be used in our ensemble average. It is convenient to
begin by introducing microstates of the system. For each time step t, we define a(k′) ≡
n1(k
′) − n0(k′), the accumulated difference between the number of times that after the
appearance of string k′, the resulting minority side was 1 (n1(k
′)) or 0 (n0(k
′)). A microstate
µ is given by (−→a , k0), where −→a ≡ (a(0), a(1), ..., a(H− 1)) has the information of the net
amount of virtual points assigned to the pool of strategies, and k0 is the string containing
the history that effectively showed up at time t.
The set of microstates is rather complex and very big. In order to get simpler expressions,
we now turn back to the other approximation in which this work is based on, the period-two
dynamics observed in [3]. Let us consider a game with s = 2, m = 2; in this case there
are only four strings k : 00, 01, 10 and 11, representing all possible results for the last two
minority groups. In their study of the time series of minority groups, Manuca et. al. kept
a record of all the times when a given string k, for instance k = 01, appeared. This record
shows a most remarkable behavior: odd occurrences of k are followed by a minority side χ
1Notice that this excludes the situation where two agents get the same pair. In any case, the
probability that this happens in the game is vanishingly small even for a moderate value of m.
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whose value is essentially random (e.g. χodd = 1), while for the next (even) occurrence of
k the result is deterministic, being the opposite of χodd (χeven = 0 in this example). This
behavior was described as a period-two dynamics (PTD) by those authors, and can be seen
to be essentially true for m = 2. In fact, we found that a plot of the probability that the
data follows this rule, as a function of z = 2m/N, displays scaling as can be seen in Fig.2,
where one can also see that this probability is greater than 0.5 if z . 0.7 .
The simultaneous use of the pool L and PTD allows a dramatic simplification of the
ensemble of states. To understand this point, let us consider one step t of the game where
a minority string k is followed by a minority side χt; as mentioned above, L/2 strategies
predict this output, and therefore get a point. Now, the next time that the string k appears,
because of PTD, the other half of the strategies (predicting the opposite minority side)
should get a point. Therefore, after an even appearance of k, all strategies will have one
extra point. But remember that these points are assigned so that one can choose the more
succesfull strategies, simply by picking up that with the greatest amount of points; in this
sense, nothing should change if, rather than adding a point to the second half of strategies,
we remove the point we already assigned to the first part. The implication of this procedure
is great: we need to consider only those microstates where |a(k)| ≤ 1. In the following, we
will always refer to this subset of microstates, and the corresponding states.
A state is defined as the set of microstates that have the same value of the variables
m,n, φ and p, where n =
∑
{k′}
∣∣a(k′)
∣∣ , φ = |a(k0)| , and p = a(k0). As mentioned above, φ
can take the values 0 or 1, while p can be equal to 0 or {1, -1}, respectively; {k
′
} is the set
of all values of k
′
. It is of some help to think of (φ, p) as an spin and its projection. In the
future we will need to write down the number of microstates of the set, i.e. the degeneracy
of the state, g(n,m, φ, p).
In Fig.3 we show a diagramatic representation of the microstates, that is also helpful to
visualize the states. Each diagram has H rows, one for every possible history of m bits; the
first column shows the value of −→a (the values 1, -1 and 0 are represented by an up or down
arrow, and an empty site, respectively), and the second column simply displays the actual
string k. There can only be one arrow for row, and up to H arrows in the diagram. Hence,
the maximun number of points that the pool L can have is 2H−1H. 2
2In the recent past there has been some discussion about the relevance of the memory [7] in the
MG. By randomly generating strings of minority sides, Cavagna obtained results essentially equal
to those of Fig.1; he concluded that memory is irrelevant in the MG, and should not be used
to explain its behavior. On the contrary, Savit argued that “the dynamics and the information
structure in the two versions are fundamentally the same”. Our diagrams are particularly useful
to shed some ligth on this point. To choose a string randomly, simply means to choose in this form
the row in the rigth column of our diagrams; this eventually will change the ‘microscopic’ behavior
of the model, but the register of what happens after the appearance of any history is not changed,
because the rules that govern the left column of the diagram are not changed.
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III. THE STANDARD DEVIATION
We now have completed the characterization of the states, and can come back to the
calculation of (N1 − N0)/N . As our approach is based on all the pairs of strategies (i.e.
virtual agents) that can be formed out of the pool , there are three rather natural magnitudes
to consider: Nd1 ( Nd0) the number of agents whose response to a given microstate will
be to choose χ = 1 (χ = 0) with certainty, hence the nickname ‘decided’ agents ; and
Nu, those agents that under the same circumstance can not make up their minds, thus
the nickname ‘undecided’. Clearly, N = Nd1 + Nd0 + Nu. In fact, after establishing a
method to know how Nu will split into those choosing 0 (Nu0) or 1 (Nu1), we can write
N1 −N0 = Nd1 +Nu1 −Nd0 −Nu0.
Recalling that every possible pair of strategies corresponds to one virtual agent, to obtain
the N ′s is convenient to know Ex1 (
−→a , k) and Ex0 (
−→a , k), the number of strategies with x
virtual points predicting χ = 1 and χ = 0, respectively, as the following minority side after
the string k. Using Ex1 and E
x
0 as a shortand notation for E
x
1 (
−→a , k) and Ex0 (
−→a , k), it is
Nu =
∑
x
Ex1E
x
0
Nd1 =
∑
x
∑
j<x
Ex1E
j
0 +
1
2
∑
x
∑
j 6=x
Ex1E
j
1 +
∑
x
(Ex1 )
2
Nd0 =
∑
x
∑
j<x
Ej1E
x
0 +
1
2
∑
x
∑
j 6=x
Ex0E
j
0 +
∑
x
(Ex0 )
2 (2)
The last two terms of Nd1 and Nd0 are equal to C
L/2
2 +L/2 (where C
q
w ≡
(
w
q
)
), and are
related with those agents for which both of their strategies predict the same side for the
string k. As we are interested in the difference (N1−N0), these factors will cancel out, and
don’t need to be considered in the following.
Microstates µ1 = (
−→a 1, k1), µ2 = (−→a 2, k2) obtained one from the other by interchanging
one or more rows in the diagrams of Fig.(3) are symmetrical, in the sense that they have
the same values Exi : E
x
i (µ2) = E
x
i (µ1) , (i = 0 or 1).This, in turn, implies Nu(µ2) = Nu(µ1),
and similarly for all terms of Eq.( 2). In other words, the values of these magnitudes depend
only on (m,n, φ, p), i.e are state dependent. Therefore, we will only need to consider the
E ′s for different states, together with the corresponding degeneracies g(m,n, φ, p). Thus,
the expression for the standard deviation becomes
σ2 =
N2
N 2
1
Ω
∑
{m,n,φ,p}
g(m,n, φ, p) [Nd1 +Nu1 −Nd0 −Nu0]
2 (3)
where Ω =
∑
{m,n,φ,p} g(m,n, φ, p).
For every state, we assume that each undecided agent chooses randomly between χ = 0
and χ = 1. Moreover, σ2 will be averaged over a certain number of independent runs; hence,
we only need the average values of Nu1 and N 2u1, that are given by the standard expressions
of the random walk, 〈Nu1〉 =
1
2
Nu and 〈N
2
u1〉 =
1
4
Nu +
1
4
N 2u .
Then
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σ2 =
N2
N 2
1
Ω
∑
{m,n,φ,p}
g(m,n, φ, p)
[
Nu + (Nd1 −Nd0)
2
]
(4)
The calculation of the different terms of Eq.(2), and the corresponding calculation of σ
(Eq.(4)) is straigthforward, but rather lengthy and cumbersome. We have displaced to an
Appendix some of the details; on the other hand it is useful to use a graphic representation
to find Ex0 , E
x
1 , and show how to obtain these terms. Notice that, regardless of which
microstate we are looking at, the set of all possible strategies will always split into two
groups of L/2 strategies each, predicting χ = 0 or 1 respectively; therefore, we just have
to find how each one of these groups will split into smaller subgroups characterized by the
number of points. Let us consider, to be specific, the case m = 2. In this case, we only need
to know the E’s for (n = 0 to 3, φ = 0, p = 0), and for (n = 1 to 4, φ = 1, p = ±1). In
Fig.(4) we show these values for the case φ = 1, p = −1, for strategies predicting χ = 0
as the following minority side. Being φ = 1 implies that we have to consider microstates
having a(k0) 6= 0. The simplest form to find the E’s in this case, is by using the diagrams
with one to four arrows. Thus, it is clear that there are L/2 strategies with one point (and
predicting χ = 0). With |−→a | = 2 (i.e. n = 2), there will be L/4 strategies predicting only
one of the minority sides (having one point), and L/4 predicting both minorities correctly
(thus having two points); analogously, for n = 3 there will be three groups of L/8, L/4, and
L/8 strategies, with 1, 2 and 3 points, respectively; finally, for n = 4 there are four groups
with L/16, L(1 + 2)/16, L(1 + 2)/16 and L/16, with 1, 2, 3 and 4 points respectively.
Graphically, this gives rise to a tree, as that shown in Fig.4, in which every row corresponds
to a given value of n, and in every site of the tree one writes Ex1 . In fact, introducing e
x
i
by writing Exi (m,n, φ, p) = 2
H−n+φ−1exi (m,n, φ, p), with i = 1 or 0, it is possible to see that
the tree associated with exi turns out to be Tartaglia’s triangle, whose analytic properties
are well known. The cases including states where (n = φ = 0) can be handled in the same
form. The difference between states with φ = 0 and φ = 1 it is apparent in the schemes
(a) and (c) of Fig.3, but from the point of view of the trees, it simply implies that when
φ = 0 the values of n are ‘shifted’; thus the ‘upper’ row has n = 0, and the ‘lowest’ one has
n = H− 1; moreover in row n, say, the different terms will have 0,1,...,n points. All terms
needed to calculate σ are simply related with different sums and products of terms of these
trees, without mixing factors from different rows.
To carry out the calculation of σ2 we use Nu , |Nd1 −Nd0| and g, as obtained in the
Appendix. The actual expressions for Nu and |Nd1 −Nd0| are functions of the value of φ,
namely
Nu =
(
2H−n−1
)2
Cn2n
Nd1 −Nd0 = 0 (5)
for φ = 0, and
Nu = C
n
2n−2 if n > 1 (6)
Nu = 0 if n = 1
|Nd1 −Nd0| = C
n
2n−2 + C
n
2n−2
for φ = 1.
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The state degeneracy is 3
g(m,n, φ, p) = Cn−φH (H− n+ φ) 2
n−φ (7)
where φ ≤ n ≤ H+φ− 1
Two points are worth mentioning, in relation with σ2. First, using Eq.(A2) in Eq.(4), we
verify that σ2 can be written just in terms of Nu ’s factors. Furthermore, this expression
can be factored out as follows: σ2 = N F (m). Notice that our general assumptions require
to consider N big enough, so that the replacement of the samples by the whole pool makes
sense; hence, the factorization should also be valid in the same limit.
Our results are presented in Fig.5. We have done numerical simulations of the MG for
N from 101 up to 1001, 50000 time steps, and m = 2 up to 13; the results where averaged
over 32 independent runs. We show both the usual simulation data, as well as the results
of the calculation with the equations derived in this work. As it can be seen, if σ
2
N
≥ 1 (and
2m/N ≤ 0.1) there is an excellent agreement between these two sets of data. For 2m/N
between 0.1 and 0.7 we only have a qualitative agreement, and for 2m/N > 0.7 our results
(not shown) are clearly inadequate.This coincides with the range of validity of the results of
Manuca et al. [3], i.e we only cover the informationally efficient phase. It is to be noticed
that in the first region our results can be fitted to a high degree of accuracy by a straight
line with slope -1.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have made a mean-field-like calculation of σ, the standard deviation of the MG. Our
approach is based on two approximations: on the one hand, rather than using the properties
of the actual samples used to calculate, we consider the whole pool of strategies, L; in this
form we benefit from the symmetry of the histories. It should be noticed that we actually
quote results that are averages over several independent runs, so that it is reasonable to
expect that they should be near to the symmetry of the pool. On the other hand, we
considered that the period-two dynamics introduced by Manuca et.al [3] is correct within
the range of validity of our work. We used these approximations to replace the time averages
appearing in Eq.(1), by ensemble averages over the states.
Our results show an excellent agreement with data from the simulation in the region
σ2/N & 1. The calculation embraces an important part of the informationally efficient
region, but the agreement is lost when σ2/N is near of its minimun value.
This method can also be useful to deal with cases where s = 3 (one needs to consider all
the sets of three strategies) or greater.
H.C. was partially supported by EC grant ARG/b7-3011/94/27, Contract 931005 AR.
3in fact this expression is totally correct in the case where the microstates have a uniform proba-
bility distribution; in a game with memory the succession of strings is obviously concatenated and
Eq.(7) is only approximated
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APPENDIX:
We provide some extra details about the calculation of Nu , |Nd1 −Nd0| and g.
The values of exi , (for i = 0, 1), that we have already identified with the coeficients in
Tartaglia’s triangle, are state dependant (remember that in site (q, w), the coeficient of the
tree is the combinatorial Cqw ≡
(
w
q
)
.
ex0(m,n, 0, 0) = e
x
1(m,n, 0, 0) = C
x
n (A1a)
ex0(m,n, 1, 1) = e
x
1(m,n, 1,−1) = C
x
n−1 (A1b)
ex0(m,n, 1,−1) = e
x
1(m,n, 1, 1) = C
x−1
n−1 (A1c)
where 0 ≤ x ≤ n, 0 ≤ x ≤ n− 1, and 1 ≤ x ≤ n in Eq.(A1a-c), respectively. In the first
equation φ = 0 and therefore 0 ≤ n ≤ H − 1, while the last two equations correspond to
states with φ = 1, then 1 ≤ n ≤ H.
We begin with φ = 0 states, i.e. (m,n, 0, 0) states, for which, following Eq.(2)
Nu = 2
2(H−n−1)
n∑
x=0
ex1e
x
0 =
n∑
x=0
(Cxn)
2 = Cn2n
Moreover, for the same states
Nd1 = 2
2(H−n−1)
n∑
x=0
n∑
j=0
ex1e
j
0 = 2
2(H−n−1)
n∑
x=0
n∑
j=0
CxnC
j
n = Nd0
Therefore, |Nd1 −Nd0| = 0.
Let us now consider φ = 1, p = 1 states, i.e. (m,n, 1, 1) states
Nu = 2
2(H−n)
n−1∑
x=1
ex1e
x
0 = 2
2(H−n)
n−1∑
x=1
Cxn−1C
x−1
n−1 = C
n
2n−2
for n > 1. If n = 1, it is Nu = 0.
Nd1 and Nd0 are given by
Nd1 = 2
2(H−n)
∑
j<x
ex1e
j
0 = 2
2(H−n)
n−1∑
j=0
n∑
x=j+1
Cjn−1C
x−1
n−1
Nd0 = 2
2(H−n)
∑
x<j
ex1e
j
0 = 2
2(H−n)
n−2∑
x=1
n−1∑
j=x+1
Cx−1n−1C
j
n−1
Finally,
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|Nd1 −Nd0| =
n−1∑
j=0
Cjn−1C
j
n−1 +
n−1∑
j=0
Cjn−1C
j+1
n−1 = C
n−1
2(n−1) + C
n
2n−2
More explicitely,
|Nd1(m,n, 1, p)−Nd0(m,n, 1, p)| = Nu(m,n− 1, 0, 0) +Nu(m,n, 1, p) (A2)
It is remarkable that the difference |Nd1 −Nd0| can be written just in terms of Nu.
Notice that this ‘nasty’ collection of coefficients can be identified with combinations of
elements of the trees. The simplest case is Nu in Eq.(2); in this case both trees (for χ = 0 or
1) are equal, and Nu is given by the sum of the squares of the factors in row n of the tree.
To calculate the degeneracies g(m,n, φ, p), one has to count the number of microstates
sharing the same values of (m,n, φ, p), using the diagramatic representation of the states.
For φ = 0,
g(m,n, 0, 0) = CnH (H− n) 2
n (A3)
where 0 ≤ n ≤ H− 1. The first factor counts the number of ways that n arrows can be
distributed into H places, the second is the number of strings available for being the actual
history (× in the diagrams), and the third takes into account that each arrow can be up or
down.
Analogously, we can write g for the case φ = 1
g(m,n, 1,±1) = CnH n 2
n−1 (A4)
with 1 ≤ n ≤ H.
It is possible to write these expressions in a form valid for both values of φ, as in Eq.(7).
Finally, the sum over all the degeneracies is the total amount of microstates, Ω(m) =∑
{m,n,φ,p} g(m,n, φ, p) = 3
2m2m.
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. Scaling of σ2/N vs z = 2m/N , for different values of m and N :  N = 101; ◦ N = 201;
N N = 301; •N = 401;▽ N = 501; × N = 1001. For each value of N and m there are 32 runs,
each one of T = 10000 time steps; for N = 1001, each run has 50000 time steps.
FIG. 2. Validity of the period-two dynamics. Number of times in which the dynamics comes
true, over the total number of times in which the corresponding history occurs for an even time.
Data are for different values of N :  N = 101; ◦ N = 201; N N = 301; •N = 401;▽ N = 501; ×
N = 1001. For each value of N and m there are 32 runs, each one of T = 10000 time steps; for
N = 1001, each run has 50000 time steps.
FIG. 3. Diagrams used to represent the ensamble of microstates for m = 2. ¿From top to
bottom, the rows correspond to the strings 00, 01, 10 and 11. The symbol × is used to indicate
the actual history; the arrows are used to represent the virtual points assigned to the strategies.
For every history with an arrow, there are L/2 points assigned. a: (2, 2, 0, 0); b : (2, 2, 1, 1); c:
(2, 2, 1, 1); d: (2, 4, 1,−1). Notice that b and c are two microstates corresponding to the same state.
FIG. 4. Array of strategies corresponding to states with m = 2, φ = 1, and p = −1. In this tree
there are represented the L/2 = 8 strategies predicting χ = 0 for the actual string. Each row of
the tree is characterized by a value of n, beginning with n = 1, up to n = 4. In each site of the tree
the number between brackets gives the amount of virtual points (x = 1, .., n) for the corresponding
strategies. There is an analogous tree for the strategies predicting χ = 1 for the same string. The
difference of both trees is given only for the virtual points assigned; in the tree for χ = 1 these
values are displaced, so that each row begins with x = 0, and ends up with x = n− 1.
FIG. 5. Data of σ2/N vs z = 2m/N for N = 1001, both for the numerical simulations and from
our calculations. As before, the results are averaged over 32 runs of 50000 time steps each.
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